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SYMPOSIUM: DAUBERT, INNOCENCE, AND
THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE
SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD
Jane Campbell Moriarty*
The years since Daubert have not been kind to those seeking to challenge
prosecutorial expert evidence, I as many of the Symposium authors recognize. After two
decades of trying to convince courts that there is no empirical basis for handwriting
identification testimony declaring a match between two samples, Michael Risinger
claims to be packing his bags and leaving the island until there is a more conducive
climate for examining the reliability problems. 2 Michael Saks, reviewing a number of
cases in which courts have found ways to avoid applying reliability standards to forensic
science, concludes wearily that "whatever the reason, in criminal cases, most judges
respond to government proffers of non-science forensic science, no matter how weak it
is, regardless of the circumstances, by admitting the testimony." 3 Erica Beecher-Monas,
discussing defendants' proposed genetic testimony in criminal trials, notes that the
evidence is often excluded on policy grounds or for a lack of helpfulness. 4 Brian Foley
begins with the recognition that while "junk science" is often used against defendants,
defendants rarely raise and even more infrequently win Daubert challenges against the
prosecution's evidence. 5  Craig Cooley and Gabriel Oberfield from the Innocence
Project remark that the failure of judges to exclude faulty forensic science is only "a
single star in a constellation of legal and forensic science shortcomings." 6  From a
* Professor, The University of Akron School of Law.
1. See e.g. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Misconvictions, Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 Neb. L. Rev.
1 (2007) (discussing the unwillingness of courts to exclude faulty forensic science when challenged by
defendants).
2. D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped
Worrying about Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and Forensic Science in General) and
Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 447, 471 (2007).
3. Michael J. Saks, Protecting Factfinders from Being Overly Misled, While Still Admitting Weakly
Supported Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 609, 622 (2007).
4. Erica Beecher-Monas, Circumventing Daubert in the Gene Pool, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 241, 241 (2007).
5. Brian J. Foley, Until We Fix the Labs and Fund Criminal Defendants: Fighting Bad Science with
Storytelling, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 397, 397 (2007).
6. Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel Oberfield, Fixing Forensic Science and Increasing the Reliability of
Forensic Evidence: Applying Daubert Isn't the Only Problem, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 285, 285 (2007).
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comparative perspective Ddirdre Dwyer observes "the expert evidence of prosecutors is
subject to less scrutiny that that of criminal defendants .... ,7 And Susan Rozelle
throws up her hands and asks, "Daubert, schmaubert," do criminal defendants get the
short end of the science stick?8 Should we abandon hope, all who have entered the arena
of forensic science challenges?
Despite a strong connection between faulty forensic science and wrongful
conviction, 9 courts continue to turn a blind eye to the failures of forensic science.
Although many of the authors herein express grave concerns that courts have been
unwilling to take seriously the challenges to forensic evidence, they have not-despite
Professor Risinger's tongue-in-cheek claim-simply given up. Rather, each author
creates new approaches to ensuring a more fair and accurate trial with respect to the use
of forensic scientific evidence.
While recognizing problems and concerns with forensic science, this Symposium
is about the future of forensic science, not the past. So it is with some relief that Michael
Risinger has unpacked his bags and Michael Saks has found a way to soften courts'
refusal to exclude evidence. Indeed, the Symposium authors offer creative and
thoughtful ways to manage forensic science evidence to account for its shortcomings
without losing sight of its potential for use.
In their article, Innocence Project Staff Attorney Craig Cooley and Research
Analyst Gabriel Oberfield chronicle numerous cases in which faulty and fraudulent
forensic science played a major role in erroneously convicting innocent people. As a
result of these problems, some appellate courts have overturned convictions or death
sentences. To improve the quality of justice, the authors propose a number of
suggestions for overhauling the forensic science community. These suggestions include
the creation of forensic oversight entities to accredit, license, and certify labs and the use
of so-called "Coverdale grants" to investigate claims of forensic science negligence and
misconduct.
Michael Risinger's article and massive appendix chronicle nearly 70 cases
involving the reliability of handwriting identification expertise post-Daubert. He
concludes that judges have failed to perform the task-specific analysis that Daubert and
Kumho Tire require, 10 understanding that such an analysis would be labor-intensive for
courts and would likely not provide an overarching statement of reliability that could be
applied to the next case in the pipeline. And while he is resigned to the fact that the
sheer daunting weight of opinions refusing to honestly address the shortcomings in
handwriting identification has foreclosed the potential for further potentially successful
challenges, he sees some reason to be hopeful: Namely, the long-awaited National
7. D~irdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different? 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 381, 383
(2007).
8. Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Do Criminal Defendants Get the Short End of the Science
Stick? 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 597 (2007).
9. See e.g. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 81 (2008) (discussing how of
the 200 exonerated defendants, 113 included erroneous forensic evidence; the second leading cause of
wrongful conviction).
10. For a fuller explication, see D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic
Science after Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 767 (2000).
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Academy of Sciences/National Research Council Committee on the Needs of Forensic
Science Report, which he hopes may urge greater scientific accountability in the area of
forensic science.
Dr. Robert Allen and Dr. Jarrad Wagner begin their article with a recognition that
the increased focus in the legal system on forensic science has lead to a number of
suggested changes, including certification of analysts, accreditation of laboratories, and
continuing education for those involved in the field.11 Drs. Allen and Wagner discuss
the serious problem of labs "drowning in casework" due to inadequate infrastructure,
notably in the area of sufficient properly trained workers to handle the volume of
cases. 12  As an example of a graduate program that provides appropriately trained
individuals, the authors describe the program at Oklahoma State University. This
program, which produces Masters-level graduates, is a combination of science and
scientific evidence, with the latter courses being taught by law faculty. The program, in
existence for seven years, was recently granted full accreditation from the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences.
Mara Merlino and co-authors provide a social-science analysis of both latent print
examination and forensic document examination cases, discussing how the government's
testifying experts have responded to the courtroom challenges on the grounds of
education, training, skill, and expertise. 13 In contraposition to the opinions of other
authors in the Symposium, Dr. Merlino's group finds that while these areas of forensic
science are "not infallible," the field rests on well-founded principles and the experts
have demonstrable expertise in the field. 14  However, they do agree with other
Symposium commentators that the field is changing to become more scientifically-
grounded and that Daubert has provided an impetus for change within the field.
Moreover, Dr. Merlino and co-authors urge forensic scientists to take seriously the need
for more standardized training, proficiency testing, and valid and reliable measures of
error rate.
By contrast, Dr. Simon Cole's article, complementing much of his other
scholarship, critiques the principles and methods of latent print examiners, arguing that
latent print examinations fail to comply with the reliability requirements that Daubert
mandates. 15 In this article, however, Dr. Cole borrows the "evidence-based medicine"
concept as a tool to evaluate latent print examinations. Premising his inquiry on
Daubert's requirements and terming his evaluation "evidence-based evidence," he
concludes that "[i]t is indeed shocking that the government appears unable to muster any
evidence of reliability .... 16 His analysis considers both a number of cases and
addresses various arguments the government puts forth to support its claims of
11. Robert W. Allen & Jarrad R. Wagner, Graduate Education in Forensic Science, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 235,
235 (2007).
12. Id. at237.
13. Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the
Reliability of Forensic Evidence, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 417 (2007).
14. Id. at 431.
15. Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic Knowledge Claims in the Post-
Daubert Era, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 263 (2007).
16. Id. at 282.
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reliability.
Using a novel approach, Professor Brian Foley suggests that it is time to consider
more indirect attacks on faulty scientific evidence, arguing that we reform the evidence
rules to allow criminal defendants an easier route to telling a compelling story of
innocence. While recognizing that lawyers should continue to make direct attacks on the
reliability and validity of scientific evidence, they should include indirect attacks "with a
story of innocence that may cause the jury to disregard the scientific evidence." 17 In
making this argument, Professor Foley urges three reforms. First, greater funding for
expert witnesses should be allowed when there is a plausible claim of innocence, since
the claim suggests that the forensic science may indeed be faulty. Second, the Federal
Rules of Evidence should be amended to make it easier for defendants to prove their own
good character with specific acts evidence. Additionally, Rule 609 should be abolished,
since it unfairly prevents defendants from testifying due to the fear of impeachment with
prior convictions.
Dr. Ddirdre Dwyer is a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of
Oxford who writes about both the English and U.S. systems regulating expert witnesses.
Her thesis is that in the fifteen years since Daubert was decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court, civil evidence is scrutinized more closely than criminal evidence. Additionally,
Dr. Dwyer notes that civil plaintiffs' experts are more searchingly examined than civil
defendants but that criminal defendants' expert evidence is examined more closely than
prosecution's expert evidence. This structure in criminal cases, however, is
counterintuitive to what we might expect, since one would expect that evidence rules are
enforced more strictly against prosecutors, given the liberty interests at stake in criminal
cases. Moreover, she posits, the "general quality of the theories, methodologies, and
quality assurance systems appear to be lower than in the civil justice systems."1 8 Dr.
Dwyer calls for greater controls, external validation, and organizational independence of
laboratories in criminal expert evidence, as well as changes to norms of conduct relating
to expert witnesses in civil litigation.
Professor Erica Beecher-Monas's article focuses on a different area of forensic
science than the other participants: The attempted use of genetic evidence by defendants
in criminal trials. She notes that the "criminal courts ... lack ... a coherent theoretical
basis for admitting or excluding expert genetic testimony." 19 While noting that many
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, find genetic testimony unpersuasive, 20 many
courts are also confused and skeptical about inferences that can properly be drawn from
such testimony. Additionally, even when such testimony is more readily admitted, such
as in the penalty phase of capital cases, the testimony is ineffective. Against this
background, Professor Beecher-Monas urges courts to evaluate specific types of genetic
testimony, focusing on the validity of the proposed evidence. If the proponent can offer
a firm scientific basis, she argues that courts should allow such evidence to be used as
mitigation for the jury to evaluate.
17. Foley, supra n. 5, at 400.
18. Dwyer, supra n. 7, at 395.
19. Beecher-Monas, supra n. 4, at 246.
20. See e.g. Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1943-44 (2007).
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In her article on forensic science, Professor Rozelle posits as a "testable
hypothetical" that criminal defendants have received the short end of the stick when it
comes to expert evidence. 2 1  Focusing on "anecdata" from cases, she discusses
fingerprints, toolmarks, eyewitness identification, and future dangerousness, all of which
support her hypothesis. Concluding that her hypothesis is correct, she finds expert
testimony decisions in criminal cases are unrelated to any articulate test of admissibility.
Rather, the decisions result from "inertia, politics, and an unintended consequence of the
defense-friendly burden of proof, combined with a healthy dose of the kind of human
fallibility that results from asking judges to play scientist."22
Michael Saks, in another of his series of articles about the substantial shortcomings
of forensic science, details some of the problems with handwriting, fingerprint
comparison, and forensic odontology. Nonetheless, he notes, the Daubert-annointed
gatekeepers-trial judges-have simply let in all the evidence. "[C]ourts have found a
multitude of ways to avoid the outcomes Daubert would have led to, had it been applied
conscientiously to the reality of the non-science forensic sciences." 23 Despite this result,
Professor Saks details some approaches judges might use, short of exclusion, to properly
cabin the evidence. Among these approaches are: permitting testimony about
observations but disallowing conclusions about a match; requiring examiners to use blind
testing; requiring experts and labs to be certified; limiting the reach of expert's testimony
to subjects that are known and supportable; prohibiting exaggerated testimony; providing
additional jury instructions; and making more frequent use of court-appointed experts
and panels of experts.
In all, the authors recognize the shortcomings of forensic science and offer
important suggestions for improving the quality of admitted evidence and thereby
improving the quality ofjustice.
21. Rozelle, supra n. 8, at 597.
22. Id. at 606-07.
23. Saks, supra n. 3, at 620.
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